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Abstract
In the domain of software engineering, the use of software components is now a well established approach.
However, it raises problems about the dynamic adaptation of these components to particular users demands.
Indeed, these components have been developed with the intent to have a wide range of use, and so they
implement functionalities which perhaps do not match precisely enough the demands of speciﬁc users.
Therefore, we address the adaptation of the coordination between components by means of so-called Mod-
erators. A Moderator is itself a coordination component managing interactions that are described and
formalized using Petri nets. More precisely, we study the dynamic adaptation of the coordination rules by
means of speciﬁc transformations of the Petri nets used to describe a Moderator.
Safety properties must be enforced to maintain a consistent cooperation among participants with respect
to the requested evolutions of the coordination rules. In particular, an adaptation of the Moderator can
be considered safe if it cannot be detected by the participants. We present a computable criterion which
enables to check such a satefy property automatically.
We illustrate our approach in the context of a computer aided learning system, by adapting the coordination
rules for controlling accesses to documents during an examination.
Keywords: coordination, adaptation, software components, Petri nets, ﬁnite automata, safety criterion.
1 Introduction
Software reuse is an old and essential concern in the ﬁeld of software engineering.
In this search, the notions of interface and modularity have progressively emerged,
leading to the current notion of software component [9,11]. Composing, assembling
components is the core of software architectures. Component models are based on
two key features:
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• the speciﬁcation of composition mechanisms or connectors [16,1]: in this case,
behavioral aspects play an important role, in addition to structural aspects [8,20].
• the ability to reuse, and thus the necessity to adapt existing components [5,12].
Inasmuch as a component is to be widely reused, the designer of this component
cannot consider in advance every possible context of use for this component. The
underlying idea to the component approach is to provide the means to adapt, and
customize a “standard” code, in order to bridge the gap between the ”intended”
use of a component (at the time of its design), and its eﬀective use.
Such a gap appears when a component is to be combined with other components,
in other words when a component is to interact with other components. Thus, this
mismatch can be reduced by altering either the component itself, or the interac-
tion, the protocol which deﬁnes the composition of the component with its current
environment. The bulk of the works in the ﬁeld of Software Adaptation [6] focuses
on the structural aspects of composition, and use components’ interfaces as a basis
for deﬁning and implementing adaptations. The interaction patterns considered
in this approach are elementary ones, namely (synchronous) procedure calls, and
(asynchronous) events publishing/subscribing. However, several works do focus on
adapting interactions rather than components, and thus explore behavioral aspects,
and the support to making up, and adapting more complex interactions.
This non invasive approach appears to be ﬁtted for handling components as black
boxes. In this setting, interactions and their adaptation can either be deﬁned by
characterizing the (possible) participating components, as in [2,18] or by focusing
more speciﬁcally on the interaction protocol itself, as in [6,19], and this paper.
Moreover, the support to implementing adaptations is developed along two main
lines:
• either generate (semi-)automatically
· adaptors from the speciﬁcation of the participants’ behaviors [20,6,19], or
· the participants’ behavior speciﬁcation, from the interaction speciﬁcation [18];
• or provide the programmer with tools that support the checking of the correctness
of adaptations. This approach is illustrated in the domain of the choreography
of Web Services in [2].
Our approach comes within the latter line, and focuses on the adaptation of
interactions: we consider the possibility of allowing adaptations of the coordination
speciﬁed in the general framework proposed in [10]. In this framework, coordination
is achieved by a speciﬁc component, called a Moderator, that controls the sequence
and conditions, i.e. the choreography [4], in which interactions are performed. The
speciﬁcation of the coordination is considered from the designer’s perspective: the
possible uses of a component are characterized by roles, whose compliance with the
component’s semantics is checked a priori.
The main contribution of this paper is to deﬁne a computable safety criterion,
which allows to determine whether an adaptation is correct, without having to
intervene into the semantics either of the protocol or of the participants. This ap-
pears to be interesting in the context of open systems, where programs are built by
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assembling preexisting components. This assembly is made possible by using and
maintaining invariant relationships between the assembled components. The notion
of interface thus allows to abstract and encapsulate the implementation of compo-
nents. The adaptation of coordination (and our approach in particular) extends this
process by aiming at enabling to alter the actual behavior of a set of coordinated
components, while keeping invariant the contract (the speciﬁcation of the coordi-
nation) that binds these components altogether. More precisely, a participant may
ask the Moderator of a conversation to depart from the (preset) behavioral rules of
the protocol, in order to adapt to a speciﬁc runtime context. To be safe, such an
adaptation should guarantee each participant taking part to the conversation that
the goal of the conversation can be reached.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst describe the functionalities and the proper-
ties of coordination components. Then, we deﬁne adaptations, the safety property
related to these adaptations and how it can be proved. Lastly, we illustrate this
adaptation approach through an e-learning case study.
2 Coordination Protocols
Protocols are intended to ensure coordination between entities of a system. A
protocol is deﬁned as a set of rules, and it is instantiated as processes, that we call
conversations, in the course of which entities follow these rules to coordinate their
respective behaviors. These rules determine which participants may take part in
a conversation, and how each one can or must contribute to its good processing.
In other words, a conversation is a process which proceeds according to a protocol
deﬁned by the following items [10]:
• Data that need to be processed in the course of a conversation,
• The initial state of a conversation, i.e. the conditions that must be satisﬁed so
that a conversation can start,
• The ﬁnal state that characterizes the completion of a conversation,
• The roles that participants can hold in a conversation, i.e. the speciﬁc contribu-
tions to the achievement of the protocol,
• Casting constraints on the attribution of roles that determine the conditions to
satisfy so that a participant may take a certain role in a given conversation,
• The types of interventions that participants can carry out to take part in a con-
versation, to make it progress,
• The behavioral constraints that determine the control structure of the conversa-
tions, i.e. in which cases a participant playing a certain role can carry out a given
intervention, as well as the eﬀect of this intervention.
The next section, and the case study (Section 4) provide two examples of coordina-
tion protocols.
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2.1 Moderators as coordination components
The main beneﬁt of coordination by protocols is to ensure the eﬃciency and the
predictability of interactions among participants with regard to the achievement of
some task. However, whatever the rules of a protocol, each participant must be sure
that they will be respected by others participants; otherwise, there is no guarantee
that the common objectives of the protocol will be reached. This can be achieved by
dissociating on the one hand the interventions in a conversation that are performed
by the participants, and on the other hand checking whether these interventions
obey to the protocol rules, which is performed by a speciﬁc component called the
Moderator of the conversation [10]. The Moderator is in charge of enforcing the
protocol rules by making the participants in the physical impossibility to contravene
the rules of the protocol [7]. More precisely, a Moderator:
• checks at its creation whether the protocol’s initial state is valid;
• records the required data into variables or into a database;
• upon a request from a participant to play some role in the conversation, returns a
positive (or negative) answer according to the fulﬁlment of the casting constraints;
• ensures that the course of the conversation fulﬁls the protocol’s behavioral con-
straints. To this end, the Moderator centralizes all the communications between
the participants in the conversation: any intervention of a participant is directed
to the Moderator and, if it is coherent with the current state of the conversation
and the rules of the protocol, the Moderator accounts for and processes it by
sending appropriate messages to other participants;
• decides the end of the conversation, after having detected either that the ﬁnal
state is reached, or that the conversation is blocked for some reason, e.g. the
leaving of a participant whose contribution is essential to ending the conversation.
To implement the behavioral constraints of a protocol it is proposed in [10] to
model the control structure of Moderators by means of the Petri net formalism [13].
The Petri net (in short PN) of a Moderator includes communication places: input
places to receive the messages sent to the Moderator by the participants, together
with output places for the messages from the Moderator to the participants. The
initial marking of this net corresponds to the initial state of any conversation of the
protocol and its terminal (deadlocking) marking corresponds to the ﬁnal state.
Figure 1 presents a simple online auction web site. The Moderator, which is the
shaded (central) part of the ﬁgure, mediates and controls the interactions between
two kind of participants: customers (which are represented on the right-hand part
of the PN), and vendors (left-hand part of the PN).
The basic scenario is the following: customers order goods from the web-
site (which is implemented by the Moderator), and then send their payment to
the website. Lastly, they acknowledge the receipt of their goods to the website.
The Moderator forwards the orders and the payments that it receives to the ven-
dors, and records the acknowledgments. Vendors accept orders (received from the
C. Sibertin-Blanc et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 189 (2007) 69–8572
Order
Accept
 Send
Collect
Receive
Acknowledge
Record
payment_cm
order_cm
Pay
ack_cm
?order_vm
payment_vm
Vendor
Customer
T1
T2
transaction
!order_cm
Init
Buying
End
End
Init
order_vm
?p
ay
m
en
t_
vm
!a
ck
_c
m
!paym
ent_cm
Init
(a)
(b)
(c)
outstanding
Fig. 1. Online auction website
Moderator), send goods, and then collect payments 3. The behavior of vendors
and customers is described by ﬁnite automata: a Vendor only receives messages
and a Customer only sends messages. This PN includes 5 communication places
(order vm, payment vm, order cm, payment cm and ack cm) that correspond to
the types of messages exchanged between the Moderator and the participants.
A High Level Petri net formalism is used, in order to process data carried by
tokens [17]. Notably, each message-token in a communication place includes the
identity of the participant that has sent or shall receive this token. In this way, the
Moderator is able to manage a dedicated thread of control for each participant and
to keep track of its state with regard to the conversation.
The PN of the Moderator of a protocol is a formal deﬁnition of the protocol’s
behavioral constraints, since it determines, for any participant in the conversation,
in which cases the Moderator can process a message received from this participant
or send it a message.
Using the PN formalism to deﬁne the behavioral rules of a protocol allows to
use techniques and tools of the PN theory to analyze behavioral properties. We
do not elaborate on other aspects of Moderators (e.g. the management of data, of
sessions, of threads of control, or granting roles to participants) since we are only
concerned here by their behaviors.
2.2 The behavior of a role
The Internal Petri Net (IPN) of a Moderator is obtained from its PN by removing
all the communication places. The sequences of transitions which are enabled in the
3 We do not represent an interaction which is out of the Moderator’s scope, namely the (physical) trans-
mission of goods: a complete system should have a place linking the Vendor’s Send and the Customer’s
Receive transitions, but this is irrelevant for our purposes, as this is not managed by the Moderator.
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Moderator’s IPN at the initial state are exactly the sequences of transitions that
may occur during a conversation in the course of which each participant behaves
according to its role. In particular, this net assumes that every message sent is used,
and that any expected message will ﬁnally be emitted.
We assume that the IPN of a Moderator features the proper termination property
[13]: the ﬁnal state is the only deadlock state, and it can always be reached from
any state that is reachable from the initial state. This property states that, in any
case, the protocol’s behavioral rules eﬀectively enable the coordinated components
to reach the goal of the protocol. This property is decidable, as it can be expressed
as the liveness of a ﬁnal transition.
We also assume that the IPN of a protocol is a bounded Petri net, that is there
is an upper bound to the number of tokens in any marking that is reachable from
the initial marking. This constraint does not prevent a component from sending
any number of messages, but it entails that the Moderator can only process a
ﬁnite number of these messages simultaneously. It also implies that we do not
consider protocols that could coordinate simultaneously an unbounded number of
components.
With regard to the participants in a conversation coordinated by a Moderator,
we assume that they have a sequential behavior. In particular, this holds for the
Vendor and Customer roles of our example (see Figure 1) since their PN is a state
machine (if the communication places are removed, each transition of the net has a
single input place and a single output place). Thus, the behavior of a component
playing this role can be described by a deterministic automaton whose transitions
are labelled either by an event of the kind !message, corresponding to the sending
of a message, or by an event of the kind ?message, corresponding to the reception of
a message. Figures 1(a) and 1(c) show the automata corresponding to the Vendor
and to the Customer roles.
For each role R, an automaton TSR can be built automatically from the IPN of
the Moderator, in order to describe all the sequences of events that a participant
playing that role can execute in the course of a conversation of the protocol [18].
In order to relate the Petri net of a moderator to the transition systems of its
roles, we introduce some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A labelled Petri net is a structure N = (P, T, Pre, Post, l) where:
• P is the ﬁnite set of places and T is the ﬁnite set of transitions.
• Pre : P × T → {0, 1} and Post : T × P → {0, 1} are the incidence functions
deﬁning the arcs from places to transitions and from transitions to places.
• l : T → E is the labelling function deﬁning the event that is performed at an
occurrence of a transition. The label of a transition sending or receiving a message
m1 is respectively !m1 and ?m1, while the other transitions are labelled by the
null event τ . A sequence of transitions s = t1.t2 . . . tn ∈ T ∗ is labelled as
l(s) = l(t1).l(t2) . . . l(tn) ∈ E∗.
• A marking is a function M : P → N that deﬁnes the number of tokens staying in
each place of the net.
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• A transition t ∈ T may occur, or is enabled, under a marking M if and only if:
∀p ∈ P, Pre(p, t) ≤ M(p).
• The occurrence of a transition that is enabled under a marking M yields a new
marking M ′ such that ∀p ∈ P,M ′(p) = M(p)−Pre(p, t)+Post(t, p). A sequence
of transitions s = t1.t2 . . . tn may occur under a marking M1 if there exists a
sequence of markings M2, . . . ,Mn+1 such that each ti may occur under Mi and
its occurrence yields Mi+1, for i = 1 . . . n.
• For a marking M of a net N , the language of N from M is the set L(N,M) =
{l(s) : s may occur under M}. When there is no ambiguity on the initial marking
Minit of the net, we note L(N) instead of L(N,Minit).
Deﬁnition 2.2 A labelled transition system is a structure A = (Q,T, q0, F, l)
where:
• Q is the set of states.
• T ⊆ Q×Q is the set of transitions.
• l : T → E is the labelling function deﬁning the event that is performed at an
occurrence of a transition.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state and F ⊆ Q is the set of its ﬁnal states.
• A path from state q1 is a sequence of states p = q1.q2 . . . qn such that (qi, qi+1) ∈ T .
The label of such a path, or the set of events realized by this path, is the sequence
l(p) = l((q1, q2)).l((q2, q3)) . . . l((qn−1, qn)), and the language of A from a state q
is the set L(A, q) = {l(p) : p is a path from q}.
• A path of A is a path from the initial state q0, and L(A) = L(A, q0).
For any participant C in a conversation and a sequence of transitions s of the
Moderator’s IPN that may occur during a conversation, s|C denotes the subsequence
of s that contains the transitions which exchange messages with C: s|C is the part of
the Moderator’s activity that interacts with C during the part s of a conversation.
Besides, (s|C)−1 denotes the dual viewpoint on the sequence s: (s|C)−1 denotes the
sequence of events that C performs to send (resp. receive) the messages that are
expected (resp. sent) by s|C .
Properties
Let IPN be the internal Petri net of the Moderator of a protocol, TSR be the
labelled transition system of a role R, and C be a participant performing role R.
The following properties relate the Moderator’s IPN to the automata of roles :
(i) TSR is a ﬁnite state deterministic labelled transition system.
(ii) For any sequence of transitions s of IPN enabled at IPN ’s initial marking,
there exists in TSR a path from the initial state which implements (s|C)−1:
∀s ∈ L(IPN) : (s|C)−1 ∈ L(TSR)
(iii) Conversely, for any role R, and any path sR in TSR starting from its initial
state, there exists a sequence s of transitions of IPN enabled at IPN ’s initial
C. Sibertin-Blanc et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 189 (2007) 69–85 75
marking, such that the sequence of messages sent and received by sR is exactly
the sequence of messages received and sent by s:
∀sR ∈ L(TSR) : ∃s ∈ L(IPN) : sR = (s|C)−1
(iv) IPN is in its ﬁnal state iﬀ TSR is also in its ﬁnal state.
3 Adaptation approach
An adaption is a change in the coordination of the components that take part in
a conversation. We consider adaptations that do not modify the signature of the
protocol, that is the type of the messages that are exchanged between the Moderator
of a conversation and the components. We deﬁne an adaptation of a protocol as
an unspeciﬁed change in the state of the Moderator of a conversation such that,
after an occurrence of this adaptation, the set of the sequences of messages that
the Moderator can send and receive can be diﬀerent from before this occurrence.
Now, the question arises whether the conversation can reach its ﬁnal state without
changing the behavior of the components.
Inasmuch as the use of coordination rules involves a contractual aspect bind-
ing the participants, one can expect that participants agree on an adaptation of
these rules. However, in this paper we will not discuss how the participants can
reach a consensus on the relevance of an adaptation, or, on the contrary, how some
participants can introduce adaptations without the other participants knowing it.
Firstly, we deﬁne adaptations more precisely, in this setting. Then, we consider
the properties that adaptations should meet in order to keep the conversation con-
sistent with respect to the initial coordination rules. Lastly, we outline how these
dynamic adaptations can be managed and implemented.
3.1 Deﬁnition of an adaptation
We deﬁne an adaptation as a change in the Moderator’s state that does not comply
with the coordination rules. This change is implemented as a new transition, which
is added to the Moderator’s Internal Petri Net and realizes the state change when
it occurs, together with the inhibition of a number (possibly null) of transitions in
IPN . Thus, the adaption may occur from any marking of the net under which this
transition is enabled, and the state change is the one resulting from the transition
occurrence. We require that, after any occurrence of the adaptation transition,
IPN is bounded and has the proper terminaison property, i.e. its ﬁnal state is
always reachable. Since IPN is bounded from its initial marking, there is a ﬁnite
number of cases to consider and these properties can be decided.
For example, Figure 2 shows an adaptation of the online auction web site: a
transition (TA) has been added to the Moderator, so that the Vendor receives a
payment only after the receipt of the goods has been acknowledged 4 .
When needed, we will distinguish the occurrence of an adaptation from the type
of an adaptation. The former denotes the execution of the state change correspond-
4 Moreover, T2 must be inhibited in the adapted Moderator, in order to make the adaptation eﬀective.
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Fig. 2. Adapted Online auction website
ing to the adaptation, from a given point throughout the course of a conversation,
while the latter is characterized by the new transition.
3.2 Transparency of an adaptation with respect to a role
Each participant in a conversation holds some role. This role deﬁnes the sequences
of messages that it can send to and receive from the Moderator. From the viewpoint
of a participant in a conversation, an adaptation is transparent if the participant
cannot detect the occurrence of this adaptation. In fact, the sequence of messages
that a participant receives after the adaptation occurrence is one of the sequences
of messages it may have received, if the adaptation had not occurred.
But this condition requires that the Moderator is able, from its new state, to
receive any message that can be sent by the participant. This leads to the following
deﬁnition of transparency:
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Transparency] Let A be an adaptation of a coordination protocol
P, R be a role of P, IPN be the internal Petri net of P, and t be the transition
that implements A in IPN. Adaptation A is transparent with respect to role R if
and only if, for any marking M of IPN reached just after an occurrence of t, and
any possible state q of a participant C performing role R when IPN is in state M :
(i) For any sequence of transitions s of IPN enabled at M , there exists in TSR a
path from q which implements (s|C)−1 :
∀s ∈ L(IPN,M) : (s|C)−1 ∈ L(TSR, q)
(ii) Conversely, for any path sR in TSR starting from q, there exists a sequence s
of transitions of IPN enabled at M , such that the sequence of messages sent
and received by sR is exactly the sequence of messages received and sent by s:
∀sR ∈ L(TSR, q),∃s ∈ L(IPN,M) : sR = (s|C)−1
The adaptation in Figure 2 is transparent, as it changes neither the sequence
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of messages received by the Moderator from the Customer, nor the sequences sent
by the Moderator to the Vendor, provided the Customer and the Vendor behave
accordingly to their roles.
Since IPN is bounded from its initial marking, there is a ﬁnite number of
markings M to consider, and TSR has a ﬁnite number of states, too. L(IPN,M) is
a regular language since IPN is bounded from marking M and thus transparency
is a decidable property.
3.3 Properties of a safe adaptation
An adaptation of a coordination protocol is safe if it does not prevent the Moderator
from coordinating the participants although each one keeps the behavior of its role:
The Moderator always sends to each participant a sequence of messages that belong
to its role deﬁnition, and it is able to process the received messages. Even if, due to
an adaptation, a conversation departs, at some point, from the coordination rules,
this ”adapted” conversation is still always able to reach its ﬁnal state.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Safety] An adaptation of a protocol is safe iﬀ: after any occur-
rence in the course of a conversation following this protocol, if the behavior of each
participant in the conversation follows the coordination rules of its role, then the
ﬁnal state of the conversation can always be reached.
Thus, the safety of an adaptation comprises, on the one hand, a constraint
on the Moderator’s resulting state, which must allow to reach the conversation’s
ﬁnal state, and, on the other hand, a constraint on the sequences of interactions
between the Moderator and the participants, which must be able to take part in the
conversation consistently with respect to their role. In particular, an adaptation
should not lead a conversation into a state where either the Moderator is blocked,
and thus cannot synchronize the participants anymore, or one of the participants
is blocked because it does not receive a message it requires in order to proceed
according to its role. Such a blocking of a conversation occurs when the current
state of the Moderator or of one the participants is such that it neither receives
a message that it needs for going on, nor is able to send a message which is expected.
The notion of safety can be related to the more general concept of conformance
(i.e. substitutability with respect to simulation and stuck-freeness) in labelled tran-
sition systems [15] in the following sense: an adaptation of a coordination protocol
is safe if the whole adapted system (i.e. the adapted Moderator plus the partici-
pants) conforms to the non-adapted system. In other words, safety appears as a
special case of conformance, aiming at characterizing conformant adaptations that
are local to a specﬁic component, namely the Moderator.
Theorem 3.3 (Safe adaptation) Let A be an adaptation of a coordination pro-
tocol P. If A is transparent for each of its role, then it is a safe adaptation.
Proof. We have to show that, except at the ﬁnal state, it never occurs that the
Moderator and all components C can neither send nor receive a message. Let us
C. Sibertin-Blanc et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 189 (2007) 69–8578
remark that, if the adaptation is transparent for the role of C, properties i) and ii)
of Deﬁnition 3.1 hold for any marking of IPN and any state of C that are reachable
after the occurrence of the adaptation. Thus we only have to show that there is no
deadlock after the occurrence of the adaptation. Let M be the marking of IPN and
q be the state of C. By deﬁnition of an adaptation, L(IPN,M) is not empty. If it
contains a sequence that begins with a send action, the transition labelled by this
action may occur in IPN . Else, each sequence in L(IPN,M) begins with a receive
action and, from i) of Deﬁnition 3.1, C is able to send the corresponding messages.
From ii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 we can assert that C cannot send a message that IPN
is not expecting and thus cannot process. The reverse reasoning shows that, if C
is blocked waiting for messages from IPN , it will necessarily receive one of these
messages. Thus, when IPN eﬀectively interacts with the coordinated components,
the resulting system is deadlock-free. It remains to show that the system has no
livelock, that is if IPN and the components enter a loop, they always have the
possibility of exiting. If IPN is in a loop having a send message exit, it can ﬁre
this transition. Otherwise, if all exits are receive actions, then from i) of Deﬁnition
3.1, there always exists a participant that can send an expected message. 
3.4 Performing adaptations
Adaptations can be used in two diﬀerent settings:
• either oﬄine: the Moderator’s designer is in charge of providing a set of adapta-
tion schemes available to future users. The original design thus includes the initial
coordination and its adaptations, which can be activated on request. In this case,
the safety of these adaptations can (and should) be veriﬁed before execution on
the grounds of Theorem 3.3;
• or at runtime: then, the safety property of a requested adaptation should be
veriﬁed on demand by a speciﬁc adaptation service. Safe adaptations can then
be registered and activated as in the previous case. In this case, checking the
transparency conditions (Deﬁnition 3.1) is simpler than in the previous case, as
we only have to consider the Moderator’s current marking, M , and the current
state q of each participant.
Safe adaptations can be activated by the Moderator either temporarily or per-
manently. In the former case, the adaptation will only have one occurrence, whereas
in the latter case, it will remain enabled until the user explicitly requests its removal,
or until the current conversation reaches an end.
To carry out a requested safe adaptation, we can investigate two diﬀerent im-
plementations :
• either the Moderator has a monitoring service, which blocks the transitions in-
hibited by the adaptation, performs the adaptation state change as soon as the
condition for its occurrence is true, and then unblocks the inhibited transitions.
• or, the Moderator’s PN already contains the transition t which implements a
given (predeﬁned) adaptation A. Then, the activation of A will be implemented
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by temporarily setting t’s priority from a negative level (i.e. t is not enabled)
to the highest level (i.e. t will be ﬁred before any other enabled transition), and
conversely from a positive to a negative priority level for the inhibited transitions.
4 Case study
We illustrate our approach with a case study about the control of accesses to docu-
ments by students during an online examination. Figure 3 describes the interactions
between the e-learning computer system (ECS), the assistant and any student.
To participate to the examination, a student has ﬁrst to log in to the ECS.
According to the student’s proﬁle, the ECS determines the list of documents that
this student is granted to access. This list of authorized documents is supplied to
each student at the beginning of the examination. However, purposely or not, a
student may access a non-authorized document.
ECS
Supervisor
Student
doc-access
1st forbidden doc-access
warning
2nd forbidden doc-access
penalty penalty
warning
return examination
Init
doc-access
(after warning)
End
End
T8
T5 T6
T10
T11
T15
T29
T18
T16
T9
T24
T27
T17
T21
T18
T23
T28
T32 T12
T33
T7
T31
T30
P9
P15
P11
P13
P24
P10
P16
P3
P14
P22
P35
P19
P34
P26
T13
P13
P18
P27
P31
P21
Punished
Warned
Init
1st access
2nd access
P12
Fig. 3. Global description of the cooperation related to the control of accesses to documents
The e-learning computer system (ECS) acts as the Moderator of the examination
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process, where a single participant plays the Supervisor role while the Student role
may be played by several participants.
The ECS executes the PN that is the central part of ﬁgure 3. At the beginning
of an examination, the initial place P8 contains one colored token for each student,
and so does the terminal place P28 at the end of the examination. The left-hand
part of Figure 3 shows the behavior of the supervisor role, while the right-hand part
shows the behavior of any student.
Access document checking is performed by the ECS. To this end, the workstation
of each student informs the ECS of any document access (transition T6, or transition
T11 if the student has already received a warning). The ECS then checks whether
this document belongs to the list of documents authorized for the student (transition
T5, or T12). If the document is authorized, transition T31 (or T32) occurs. If it
is not the case, the system informs the assistant that supervises the examination
(transition T7, or T16).
A faulty access may be handled in three ways:
(i) The access violation is the ﬁrst, but is a major one. The assistant immediately
imposes a penalty to the student (sequence of transitions T8 → T24 → T27).
(ii) It is the student’s ﬁrst unauthorized access, and this access is not serious. The
assistant warns the student not to repeat this action (sequence T8 → T9).
(iii) It is the second unauthorized access of the student. Regardless of the access
seriousness, the student is imposed a penalty (sequence T16 → T13 → T27).
When the student has to bear a penalty, the penalty is recorded by the ECS (tran-
sitions T27 and then T28, or T30), and the student must stop the examination
(transition T29 if it is after the ﬁrst unauthorised access, or T15 if it is after the
second one) and send his work to the computer system (transition T18). Transitions
T17, T23 and T21 record the student’s work in the various cases.
4.1 Access control policy for documents
Figure 4(a) gives the student behavior in which transitions are either receiving or
sending. The current state of the automaton always remains its initial state while
accesses are allowed. A forbidden access leads to either a warning or a penalty.
Figure 4(b) describes the supervisor behavior. From its initial state, forbidden
accesses are signaled and lead to either warning or penalty messages.
4.2 Adaptation example
The current Moderator reports unauthorized accesses to the assistant. The ﬁrst
time, the assistant can choose either to warn the student or to assign a penalty (see
place P13 and transitions T9 or T24 in ﬁgure 3). The second time, the assistant
assigns a penalty (see transition T13). A more rigorous or a more tolerant attitude
can be implemented by means of an adaptation.
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? penalty
? warning
Init EndPunished
! doc-access
? penalty
Warned
P18
P27P3 ! return
examination
! return examination
! return examination
! doc-access
P31
(a) Student automaton
 ! penalty
! warning
? 1st forbidden doc-access
?2nd forbidden doc-access
! penalty
2nd access
1st access
P12
P13
P21
Init
(b) Supervisor automaton
Fig. 4. Automaton graphs
A more rigorous adaptation:
Figure 5(a) illustrates a more rigorous attitude which consists in assigning a
penalty as soon as the ﬁrst forbidden access occurs. In this case, when a token
enters P11, a new transition, T35 is introduced. This transition deletes this token
and puts a token into P24. With respect to the Moderator, the document access
(doc-access place) is now directly interpreted as a document access after warning
(doc-access (after warning) place). This new behavior of the ECS remains consistent
with the student behavior and the requesting role, namely the assistant, behavior.
In this case, the Moderator must be prevented from signalling the ﬁrst forbidden
access to the Supervisor. As stated in Section 3.4, this can be implemented either
by giving the adaptation transition (T35) a higher priority than transition T7, or
by inhibiting transition T7.
This adaptation is safe because, according to Theorem 3.3, this adaptation is
transparent for the supervisor and student roles: the accessible states of the super-
visor automata become (Init, 2nd access) and, for the student automata, the direct
path (Init → Punished → End) remains in use.
A more tolerant adaptation:
Figure 5(b) illustrates a more tolerant attitude which consists in hiding alert
occurrences to the Supervisor. In such a case, when tokens are present in P10 and
P36, a new transition, T34 deletes these tokens and puts a new token into P8.
Thus, the PN state returns to a previous marking.
Such an adaptation again is safe because of the transparency property with
respect to the roles. In this case, accessible states of the student automata become
(Init, 1st access) and the supervisor automata remains in the initial state.
A counter-example:
The assistant could allow a student to make more than two unauthorized ac-
cesses. This adaptation would be implemented by a transition moving a token from
P15 (doc-access (after warning)) toward P9 (doc-access). But this adaptation does
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not satisfy our safety criteria. Indeed, the arrival of the token in P9 can cause a
token to be put into P14 (warning), while the student is no longer able to process
this token: transition T10 is not enabled because the student’s token stays in P18
instead of P3. In this state, no transition may occur in the student’s net.
T35
P11
P24
1st forbidden doc-access
2nd forbidden doc-access
doc-access
(after warning)
doc-access
ECSSupervisor
(a) A more rigourous attitude
P36
T34
P10
Supervisor
ECS
doc-access
1st forbidden doc-access
doc-ac es
(b) A more tolerant attitude
Fig. 5. Local adaptation of the PN
5 Conclusion
We propose a framework for specifying the coordination between components, han-
dling and checking adaptations of this coordination. In particular, we deﬁne a
computable safety criterion, which allows to determine automatically whether an
adaptation is correct. Moreover, we propose a pattern for checking and handling
(dynamic) adaptation requests, that comes into the more general framework pro-
posed in [14].
Putting our proposal into practice undergoes taking into account limits and
issues which are inherent to the ﬁeld of operational models, namely:
• The veriﬁcation of the safety of an adaptation involves a cost insofar as a vali-
dation must be run onto the PN. This validation is grounded on an exhaustive
system state space exploration, and its limits, in general, are those of model check-
ing. The validation of the safety of an adaptation can though beneﬁt from works
on conformance checking [15]. This can lead to constrain the PN modiﬁcations
so that this analysis remains scalable according to the PN size.
• The lack of modularity, which does not enable to design adaptations at a higher
level of abstraction than the original transition system. On practical grounds,
our approach is sensible, as we only consider the validation of adaptations de-
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ﬁned by programmers, but it is less attractive than the approach that consists in
generating a set of correct adaptations.
The idea of safety (of an adaptation) addresses both complexity and modularity
as it aims at characterizing and verifying the impact of a localized adaptation in
a component (namely, the Moderator) of a composite system. In this spirit, our
approach could be prolonged in several ways:
• By deﬁning a stronger safety criterion to characterize safe adaptations, inde-
pendently from roles and thus from transparency. This criterion, based in the
substitutability between the initial Moderator, and an adapted Moderator would
enable to check locally a local adaptation.
• Transparency could be used to check that an adaptation (an arbitry change of
state) of a participant remains consistent with an existing coordination protocol:
if the Moderator’s IPN is transparent with respect to the adapted role, then the
new (global) system conforms to the initial system. Again, we have a means to
check locally a local adaptation.
If one wants to implement complex adaptations, the composition of adaptations is
another important issue: an adaptation can be safe from the initial deﬁnition of the
coordination rules, and become unsafe after having performed another adaptation.
Therefore, the safety must be checked by comparing the “adapted language” of the
Moderator (that is the language resulting from the coordination plus the already
integrated adaptations) with the language resulting from the additional adaptation.
From a software engineering perspective, our approach must be supported by a
set of tools, in order to facilitate the checking of the correctness of the design and
of the adaptation of coordination protocols:
• We provide a tool generating the role automata from the Moderator’s IPN [18].
• For usability purposes, the results of the safety analysis should be made available
to the programmer, in order to allow the debugging of adaptation requests.
• More generally, the programmer should be provided with tools enabling him to
assess the impact of an adaptation on overall performance [3].
Lastly, this proposal opens the way to a methodological approach; the designer can
specify a basic scenario which ensures a core of safety properties and consequently
a rich set of behaviours. Then, speciﬁc rules can be introduced in an incremental
way, as adaptations. This could provide a smooth and ﬂexible design process.
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